American Journal of Political Science (2023) [Paper]

(with Milan Vaishnav)

Abstract: National security crises often generate a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect, especially under nationalist administrations, but the salience of a security crisis varies within a country. Does exposure to a crisis intensify rallying by fomenting nationalism, inciting hawkishness, and distracting from quotidian economic concerns? Or does exposure deepen dissatisfaction with the incumbent, thereby reducing a rallying effect? We argue the latter using evidence from a difficult test in India. A major pre-election terrorist attack boosted the nationwide popularity of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the nationalist ruling party. Yet we find that proximity to the victims’ funeral processions, which served as patriotic rallies, substantially reduced BJP support where the party was incumbent. The size and breadth of our observed effects indicate that the social commemoration of the attack, rather than direct personal connections to its victims, fuelled anti-incumbent sentiment. Mobilizing collective anger after a crisis may dampen rather than augment a rally-around-the-flag effect.

[One of two job market papers]

Abstract: Two foundational views underpin research on the reach of African states and their services. First, state infrastructure is perennially sparse in rural hinterlands. Second, leaders narrowly funnel public goods into co-ethnic regions. But there are few comprehensive and granular empirical assessments of these views, since there is a dearth of data in regions of limited state presence. This paper documents African state expansion by applying machine learning methods to sixty terabytes of satellite imagery, identifying and dating the construction of government schools in a quarter million rural African villages—and government clinics, for a smaller sample—over the past thirty-five years. The findings from this panel dataset challenge conventional wisdom. While disparities in the presence of public infrastructure remain, historically neglected regions are “catching up” in virtually every country. Further, there is little evidence that ethnoregional favoritism significantly distorts public facility allocation. These results suggest a need to reformulate the politics of state expansion in Africa.

Draft available upon request.

[One of two job market papers]

Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of “hollow state expansion,” in which states significantly broaden the territorial reach of public facilities but leave them nearly devoid of staff and supplies. Hollow expansion is a puzzling strategy, as it is expensive and unpopular. Why do states engage in hollow expansion, and how do they manage its political fallout? This paper answers these questions with two original surveys and survey experiments, administrative data, and qualitative evidence from Uganda, an archetypal hollow state. First, planned corruption produces hollow expansion. State decision-makers build facilities to embezzle public funds in collusion with contractors, providing little for facility operations. Second, rent seeking reshapes distributive politics, as marginalized peripheries become desirable sites for extraction. Third, leaders can divert blame for hollowness onto leakages and negligence by local middlemen. Petty larceny provides political cover for grand corruption by the hollow state.

Draft available upon request.

(with Ken Schultz)

Scholars and policy makers have argued that territorial revisionism is dangerous because it risks setting off a cascade of claims by states dissatisfied with their borders. This “Pandora's Box” logic has been invoked both to explain the acceptance of a territorial integrity norm in some parts of the world as well as to advocate for efforts to resist attempts at conquest. Although plausible, this logic has not been subject to theoretical or empirical examination. Under what conditions can territorial stability emerge in the face of widespread dissatisfaction with borders? Is there evidence that fears of widespread revisionism have deterred states from making territorial claims? In this paper, we develop a multi-state model of territorial conflict which demonstrates that, under certain conditions, an equilibrium can exist in which states cooperate to preserve the territorial status quo in order to avoid claims to their own territory. We then explore this logic empirically by testing whether vulnerability to potential claims from third-party states deters states from contesting the status quo. We find some evidence that this logic contributed to a reduced risk of territorial revisionism in post-independence Africa, where this logic is most frequently invoked, but not in other regions. We conclude that while a “Pandora's Box” of potential claims and counterclaims can provide the basis for a self-enforcing norm of restraint, this equilibrium emerges under restrictive conditions that have not been common historically.

Draft available upon request.

Dissertation book project.

(with Alicia Chen)